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Living Deontological Ethics

Mindaralew Zewdie ¹

¹ Department of Philosophy, Addis Ababa University

*Corresponding author:
mindaralew.zewdie@aau.edu.et

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Abstract

Most philosophical undertakings, in the history of philosophy are purely conceptual. That in its own makes it rather difficult if not impossible to tie them down to an ordinary tempo of everyday mundane activities. One such philosophical treatise is the absolutist, rational and monist ethical theory known as deontological ethics. The overriding objective of this research is thus to show what it takes to bring this deontological ethics down to an empirical façade of life. Put differently, this research is designed to bring to daylight the idiosyncrasies there are to living deontological ethics in an ordinary life-setting. To this end this philosophical research went on supporting the aforementioned aim with a case study such that it would become handy to show the shape the deontological moral imperatives would take. To this end, this research made every use of the rational and critical methods of philosophical probing with an eye on and in due support obtained from a key informant interview. Following a thorough review of the related literature and analyzing logically the information obtained from an unstructured interview on a case study, this research was able to draw some conclusions which unfold as follows: Living deontological ethics, every step of our way might sound difficult but not untenable. When we – human beings – live the precepts of deontological ethics, we will have a chance given to us by ourselves to realize that there are lots, way more lots of things, persons, groups, communities et cetera that we are indebted to, that we owe so much more than we can admit.

Keywords: deontological ethics, moral precepts, utilitarianism, good will, rational morality

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theoretical background of the study

Ethics in its classic effervescence and traditional essence exudes humanity, in a manner of speaking. As a moral philosophy ethics confers upon itself the onus of studying a moral community with a superlative degree of emphasis on humans' decisions, actions and consequences of their actions. To this end ethics comes up with a gamut of theories, principles and precepts. With the said theories and principles at hand ethics sets out to sit in judgment upon human decisions, actions and the resulting aftermaths of these actions. The judgments passed after a philosophical probing and pondering over the given case come in forms that tout the very decisions, actions and their consequences as right or wrong, good or bad, worth appreciating or condemning, moral or immoral et cetera. But then, philosophers don't agree, as opaquely insinuated above, as to where we ought to apply ethical principles so that we can pass moral judgments. For some, the focus of moral judgments ought to be the action of humans whereas

for others the focus ought to be on the results of human actions. Based on this difference there followed two major theoretical schools in ethics: Those which argue in favor of human action or duty and those in favor of the results of the human actions as a focal point to pass moral judgments on (Kant, 1959; Katen, 1973; Leighton, 1923). Schools that consider human actions as lotuses where moral judgments should pivot on go by the name deontological ethics; and schools that consider the results of human actions as sites, as objects of moral considerations and judgments go by the name teleological ethics.

To put it in brass tack, the two schools thus come up with two different and often opposite criteria of morality. The deontological criterion of morality is duty-bound whereas the teleological criterion rests on the result of an action. In other words, both theories command us to do that which is right and no to do that which is wrong. In both cases we are under the imperatives which read: we ought to do that which is morally good and we ought not to do that which is morally bad. In giving moral commands both theories seem to be on the same wave length. However the difference pops up clear and sound when we take a close look at the nature of the two moral commands. The teleological school's ought is conditional whereas the deontological school's ought is unconditional. It follows that when one hobnobs with the teleological theories, the moral command one gets reads: You ought to do it if it brings you this and that and those results. That is exactly why the teleological ought is dubbed a conditional moral imperative, an if...then moral imperative. It is very much rooted into the empirical world, and twice as empirical consequences.

Contrary to the teleological theories, the deontological ones are noted for moral oughts or moral commands that are unconditional. Pursuant to this, I can say that, when one marches to the tunes of deontological ought, the command she/he gets reads: You ought to do it because it is the right thing to do so! There are no ifs or thens. That makes it come unconditional and go unconditional. For this reason the deontological ethics is also touted pure, rational and a priori moral doctrine. The German giant, Immanuel Kant, elucidates this point as follows:

Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e., as a ground of obligation, must imply absolute necessity; he must admit that the command "Thou shalt not lie" does not apply to men only as if other rational beings had no need to observe it. The same is true for all other moral laws properly so called. He must concede that the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori, solely in the concepts of pure reason. And that every other precept which rests on the principle of mere experience, even a precept which in certain respects is universal, so far as it leans in the least on empirical grounds...maybe called a practical rule, but never a moral law...For the pure conception of duty and of the moral law generally, with no admixture of empirical inducements, has an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives which may be derived from the empirical field that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises them and gradually becomes master over them. It has this influence only through reason which thereby first realizes that it can of itself be practical (Kant, 1959).

With reason exalted in the strictest sense of the term as the ultimate foundation of morality, it is clear that human nature and inclinations as well as everything empirical can't qualify to be candidates for moral judgments let alone to be foundations of morality. Kant is doubly clear on this score. So many things could be good in this life. But none can become anywhere near being good without qualification. Intelligence, wit, courage, prudence, power, money, fidelity, honor can be good, but not so without qualification. They are deemed good when and only when are they based on good will. Thus we are left with and come to have the only one good that is good without qualification, namely the good will. It is the will on which all other qualities depend for them to be good.

Kant can never be more unequivocal than he is when he defines the good will, "Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will (Kant, 1959). Even so, even if one claims that her/his actions are totally predicated on good will, Kant feels like double checking it for purity, double checking it such that it has nothing to do with those considerations, other than the good will, those calculations in contradistinction to acting out of duty (Miller, 1984). Not to put too fine a point on it, what I am at is Kantian

imperatives known as categorical imperatives. Our actions should be checked by the categorical imperative for their purity, for their being free from anything empirical, for their being duty bound, for their being docked absolutely on pure reason, for their being a priori. Hence our actions in order that we are certain of their being moral must sit and pass the test of the categorical imperative which holds that, “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1959).

In what appears to be a diametric opposite stance to Kant’s deontological ethics, the teleological school chooses the result of an action as a lotus and focus of moral judgments. Accordingly an action is to be judged moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or evil et cetera, depending on its results. However, not all results of our action merit a favorable moral judgment. Only those results of our action that bring pleasure home are said to be morally good, otherwise bad. This ethical school goes by the name hedonism, a school that exalts pleasure, or hedone (which in Greek means pleasure), as the criterion of morality. So far, it is so good. Yet a catch stands in the way of hedonists. Although all hedonists agree on the issue of pleasure to be the final goal and also the criterion of a moral action, they do walk their separate ways when it comes to the question of whose pleasure that we are talking about. Those theories which argue that it is the pleasure of the individual, the doer, the performer of the very action that they are concerned with, that a moral theory ought to be concerned with, go by the name egoistic, I-istic, or individualistic hedonism; and those which argue in favor of the pleasure of social beings, the collective whole, the social whole go by the name social hedonism or utilitarianism. The division nonetheless doesn’t end here. The egoistic hedonists that hold: the pursuit and production of one’s own pleasure is the highest good in their turn do part company. Thus they go their own separate ways on the issue of the foundation of their individual oriented pleasure principle. Some argue to plant their arguments on natural and psychological soils while others prefer to stick to moral foundation, hence the names psychological egoism and moral or ethical egoism respectively. The same holds good, somehow for social hedonism or utilitarianism. Utilitarianism as a moral philosophy holds that an action is morally good providing it promotes the greatest balance of good over evil, right over wrong, pleasure over pain for the greatest number of people. John Stewart Mill writes very much to this effect:

“The utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. “To do as you would be done by,” and “to love your neighbor as yourself,” constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest ideal to this approach, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness or the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole (Mill, 1957).

Utilitarians go their separate ways when they encounter the question of the type and amount of social pleasure. That is exactly where the issue of quantity and quality of pleasure come to the fore. For Jeremy Bentham, in the utilitarian principle which has it to say: the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for the greatest number of people, the greatest pleasure means the MOST pleasure, whereas for John Stewart Mill the greatest pleasure means the BEST pleasure. Bentham succinctly puts his position in favor of the most pleasure as follows:

Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnishes more pleasure, it is more valuable than either (Bentham: 1838: 253). John Stewart Mill holds tightly to his quality pleasure principle as he succinctly argues for it as follows: “A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable, probably of more acute suffering and, certainly accessible to it at more points than one of an inferior type, but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence... It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied (Mill, 1957).

There is a certain, undeniable, too good to be true sort of beauty to ethical theories. The question of existential import that stares us stark in the eye is however, the world is not suffering from lack

of either diversity in theoretical approaches or in the logical beauty there is in most of the theories whose thumbnail sketch I have given above. The world suffers from eschewing these theories and giving priorities to other priorities which run low in their appeal for moral principles at best; which run in contradistinction to any moral theory, at worst. This world of ours could have been a better place to live in had people of all ages strictly had their behaviors adjusted to and thereby led all along by terms that are in perfect chime with moral principles.

In a world where there is such a moral theory as deontological ethics, a theory that admonishes us to do a given thing providing it is the right to do so, because it is our duty to do it, we observe scores of states across the globe failing miserably to do what they have promulgated in their laws, what they have enshrined in their constitutions as their duty. Deontological ethics, despite a few hiccups it suffers from, is a very good theory of rational origin that was wary of the loophole people might see in it and thereby grab, in the name of doing one's duty (Mindaralew, 2013; Sandler, 2018; Traer, 2020; Whyte & Cuomo, 2016). Thus deontological ethics demands that what makes your actions morally right is not only that they are done because you think it is your duty to do them, but also they must be, your actions must be, of that nature such that they all stem from a good will. By Kant's light, as shown above, it is only the good will which is good without qualification. Still, there is a chance for someone to mete out what she/he thinks is their duty emanating from a good will, and still to end up in being morally bad. Deontological moral perspective has a way out for this possible crack through which actions docked on bad will might peep. And that way out turns out to be the moral imperatives, one of which holds that: act only according to that maxim which you at the same time will to become a universal law (Kant, 1959). To live according to this maxim may force us to pay prices that seem too much to think of, to say nothing of to bear. Moral world and the beauty there is to it don't come for free. Sometimes they come with heavy prices that might appear too daunting for some of us even to think of, let alone to try. But there are some people across the globe that are more than ready to pay whatever price a moral life might make it a must upon them. One such person who comfortably takes all the prices a deontological moral life demands is Woizero Ejigayehu Makonnen. Ejig'ayehu not only complied by deontological imperatives, but also lived them, in the strictest sense of the term.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Within a discipline touted philosophy if there is one, among many others, soft spot from which the very discipline suffers it is its being highly conceptual and twice as theoretical. Not to put too fine a point on it, philosophy has its entire quintessential come in a package known as conceptual this and theoretical that. In an attempt to bring philosophy down to everyday life tempo where everything seems to come and go in a manner that sounds empirical, philosophy this time around develops an offshoot known as applied philosophy. Case in point is environmental ethics. One question merits itself at this hiatus: is it not possible, without resorting to applied adaptations, to make full use of, say classic ethics, within frontiers that are so to speak an ensemble of empirical life as it gets manifested within the social setting? This research is all about attempting to provide a philosophical answer by wedding classic ethics into social and empirical world within Ethiopian setting.

2 Methodology

For the success of this research the researcher drew heavily up on two sources: primary and secondary. The secondary sources that come so handy for this research are classic and contemporary books in philosophy in general and deontological ethics in particular, journals and related works from other disciplines, to cite just a few. As to the primary source, the researcher conducted a fieldwork where data relevant to the task at hand were gathered. Since this research is a bold philosophical undertaking bent on wedding the purely conceptual enterprise namely philosophy with the empirical social reality, the researcher made use of the rational and critical methods that are home to all philosophical endeavors coupled with qualitative data gathering methods such as key informant interview and personal observation. Interspersing the rational and critical methods of philosophical analysis and synthesis with the

empirical methods of thematic approach analysis the data thus gathered were organized, categorized analyzed and systematized into a research reporting format.

3 Presentation and discussion of Results

Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen was poor by all measurable standards that are home to economics, sociology, anthropology and political science (Mindaralew, 2013; Seligsan & Passe-Smith, 2004; Todaro, 1981). In the suburb of a town along Addis Ababa-Hawasa highway named Aris Negele, Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen lived in a squalid house with her son and his wife. She had a son who married a woman while he had nothing to keep himself alive except the house of his mother. In effect we have three poor people living under the roof of a squalid, battered, tattered to smithereens-house which is the next thing to living in an open air. Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen, her son and her daughter in-law do represent destitution at its worst. That is how they lived the best part of their lives. And yet Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen was never heard complaining about her hard pressed life which is but a terrible material version of impoverishment. If she was ever heard in public, Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen was heard extending her thanks to God every day she made it home with the money she obtained from cloths-washing, cereal-pounding, dry-dung collection and selling, lines of trade from which she made her livelihood. This façade of her life was known almost to the entire residents of the town of Arsi Negele and its environs.

One bright day a local NGO named Survival of the Endangered approached her before she left her low built shabby house for the high demanding and low-earning line of her trade in her miserable life. The people from the domestic NGO, one of whom turned out to be my key informant in this research, took their time and explained to her how she came to their attention, and why they decided to help her and how they intended to help her. Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen was a very good listener. All her life she had been a silent listener to the unstoppable harangue of poverty. It is a piece of cake for her to listen to the rhetoric of the people from the very NGO. While they were explaining to her all the reason that brought them to her home she showed neither excitement, nor disappointment, nor disapproval. She was just listening to them, for what their talk was worth. The only time she was heard forcing a sound into the air was when she thanked God, as was the case with most Ethiopian women (Mindaralew, 2014). And that came at the end of the explanatory bout of the people from the domestic NGO. Her meant gratitude for God was taken by the NGO people that Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen agreed to what they had brought her home, a development project meant to lift her from her below poverty station in life to some notch, a higher notch, a far too better notch representing a descent life.

At the end of the day the NGO people gave Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen a ram and an ewe with money they thought she would use to buy what she deemed necessary to manage the sheep farm. Ironically it is dubbed the sheep farm. The assumption is that the ram and the ewe following the laws of nature they would give birth to a lamb or two if luck is with Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen. The ewe in time giving birth to another round of lamb or lambs and the new generation of lambs also in their turn giving birth to another generation of lambs is what the NGO people thought to be a magic economic formula that would lift the life of Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen and her family from the quagmire of poverty in which they had been squelching for decades.

But Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu Makonnen had another idea. Instead of waiting for months and years until the sheep would reproduce themselves to a level affluent enough to wrest her free from the cold grips of poverty, Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu decided to take the game all into her hands. Sending all that development rhetoric's of the NGO people in one ear and out the other, Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu and her family took the ram and the ewe to a distant market noted for good prices being offered for sheep. Her knowledge about the local markets came handy in her favor this time. She sold the two sheep and went back home with a slight smile on her parched lips. Now she had to wait for a few days before the day for another local market known for high supply of livestock and sheep came to pass. This implies, in this local market the prices of sheep are reasonably low. Still the law of supply and demand fares well. With the proceeds from the sale of the two NGO-offered sheep, Woizero Ejjiḡ'ayehu went to this market and by dusk that same day she made it home with three medium sized sheep. The gist of the matter is that, for Ejjiḡ'ayehu to have three sheep, had she followed the advice of the domestic NGO, she had to wait for

months, in the least. But now all she had to wait for before she could have three medium sized sheep is just a week.

That way she turned over, the take off money, the initial capital, a number of times before the NGO people came back to her house for their first inspection. The first inspection was meant to be conducted once every three months. By the time the NGO people came for their first inspection, they didn't know that they were in for a big surprise. They couldn't believe their eyes that the two sheep they had given her three months ago had now become seven sheep. They were surprised like none other. They thought no surprise could get any bigger. Perhaps they were wrong.

The Ngo people wasted a lot of time explaining the value there is in development theories in general and in the stages of growth theory in particular. Woizero Ejjig'ayehu listened to them all along. Done with their developmental rhetoric, the NGO people invited Ejjig'ayehu to take the floor. She did all she could to explain how the initial two sheep were turned into seven in matters of twelve market days. She added that there was not a single market day she wasted. All were used. As the saying goes, all that comes to the mill is grist. The NGO people in effect, turned out to be students busy taking notes after notes and Ejjig'ayehu their lecturer.

A year later, one day when the NGO people came to Ejjig'ayehu's house for their quarterly inspection they saw something they never ever expected to see coming. They were truly in for a huge surprise! Instead of a good sized flock of sheep to which by now they are inured, they saw two medium sized oxen in front of the newly built adobe house of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen. When they came to terms with their own overwhelming sense of surprise, they took out their cameras, video and cell-phone cameras and recorded this unbelievable leap of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu from a woman who didn't know where her next meal would come from into a boss with a newly built adobe house and two oxen.

In the days that followed there were a number of video and text reports that were sent to the donors abroad. Predictably, the donors abroad found it too good to be true. But then the videos in support of the fat reports couldn't give the prospective and former donors any chance save believing in the miraculous feat of bravery being pulled off by Woizero Ejjig'ayehu in the war against poverty. Letters of promises kept coming in following the text and video report. So a day was set for international delegation of donors to pay a visit to the house of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu. And that day happened to be two months away.

The two months-dates came to pass. The group of international donors led by the host NGO made their hilarious journey to the house of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu. By the time they arrived at the house of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu there wasn't much to be seen that could even remotely match the text and video reports that inundated the international donors a couple months ago. The two oxen with which she was supposed to till the land the NGO people promised to secure for her from the urban agriculture bureau of the town were not in evidence. They thought that someone from the family took them to a grazing land away from home. They were wrong. They had no idea that they were in for the biggest ever surprise of their life time.

A few minutes later Woizero Ejjig'ayehu cleared her throat before explaining as to the whereabouts of the two oxen and the present condition of the overall development project. She didn't take too much of their time explaining the status of the project. My key informant still had fresh in his memory the words she uttered in the face of the eagerly awaiting group of international donors. She said that she had slaughtered both oxen for the wedding ceremony she had staged for her son.

No development theory can explain this turn of events, this twist in the economic behavior of people. It is only philosophy that can explain it. To be more specific, it is deontological ethics that can offer the full account of the why that is involved in the deeds and decisions of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu. My key Informant gave his testimonials on this score as follows.

To many a question the members of international donors and those of the host NGO raised, Woizero Ejjig'ayehu's answer has it to say: You may think that I am wasteful. No I am not. My behavior is dutiful, if any. I am a very responsible person. I slaughtered the two oxen to

answer the only one duty in my life that I have never been able to answer. I have been mindful of the monthly contributions of my eddr (a traditional association for grief management). I have never failed paying my dues all along, from the proceeds of the meager income I generate from the twice as meager lines of trade I have been attending. No one from my locale was ever heard of mentioning my name in bad faith. I am poor, but I am a dutiful person. However, there has always been one thing that I couldn't get off my mind. It is always there, troubling me, as if I committed a crime.

Everyone at the scene was eager to know what it was that Woizero Ejjig'ayehu had on her mind for so long a time. And once again my key informant helped himself to his memory, for he was there that very day representing along with his colleagues the host NGO.

As to what it was she had had on her mind for quite some time, Woizero Ejjig'ayehu said that it was the mound of debt that had been piling on her with each year that came and went, that she found troubling her so much so that she nearly couldn't bear up with it. She said that she had been invited to almost all wedding ceremonies held in the town and its environs. She had been invited to them all and she made it a point of honor to be in attendance of every ceremony to which she was invited. And it is those wedding ceremonies she was in attendance that she referred to as debts piling upon her. She wanted to pay them back, but she couldn't. So she had been waiting for the right moment at which the opportunity would present itself to her. And that opportunity came to her when the NGO offered her the take-off money. To cut the long story short, that is why she decided to use the hard earned oxen for the wedding ceremony in honor of her son, who had been long since tied the knot with his wife. She hosted the wedding ceremony in main to pay back her debts which nobody asked or forced her to effect, except her mind, her being mindful of her duty.

It is clear from the discussion held above that Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen was living deontological ethics like none other. What she considered to be her duty must be meted out when and while she can. What she considered her duty to shoulder was paying back the debts she owed almost everyone in town and its environs who had invited her to the wedding ceremonies they staged. It was not a formal contract she entered into with anyone else. It was however a duty she conferred upon herself to look after. And the whole time she had been thinking of paying the debt she owed almost everyone in her locale, in her town, but time was not in her favor, logistics was not in her favor, either. She had to wait for the right time, and when the right time came she didn't hesitate, nor did she have second thoughts to pay back what she considered was a debt she owed almost everyone in town. And she did it by staging a wedding ceremony for her son, although he had been in marriage for quite some time. Ejjig'ayehu knew very well, needless to mention that it was a marriage entered into without a wedding ceremony. What Woizero Ejjig'ayehu did is a paragon of living deontological ethics, which among other categorical imperatives of it states that perform an action, mete out your duty according to that maxim which you at the same time will to become a universal law (Kant, 1959).

A question suggested itself at this juncture. I addressed it to my key informant. It was all about what the entire members of the international donors and the NGO he represented felt at the sound of the Kantian deontological answer Woizero Ejjig'ayehu produced in light of her decision to slaughter the two oxen and stage a wedding ceremony for her son. This is how he responded to it:

Woizero Ejjig'ayehu was very honest in informing everyone present at the site on the response of the community. She said that most members of the community were talking on her back and referring to her with words of disapproval bordering on insults. Even when some of the people came with good words approving her deed, they were all done with tongues in cheeks. The most astonishing thing about them is that however none of the people she invited to the wedding ceremony were absent. All of them I can say came to her home and went shares with her on her pleasure. But then none of the rough tongues that swung on her back after the ceremony was over mattered to her. What mattered to her most was the fact that she paid back all her debts to the community.

Like we could learn from the aforementioned Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen's economic behavior can be explained by a host of theories from the rack and rank of development economics (Mindaralew, 2013; Seligson & Passe-Smith, 2004; Todaro, 1981). However her decision to do what she has done can best be explained by Kantian deontological ethics. In fact she lived the categorical imperative of Kant in manners that speak volumes upon volumes about deontological ethics. She did what has done simply because it is the right thing to do. That is what she exactly insinuates at when she said whatever the people in town said of her decision mattered not to her. What mattered most to her was her being able to pay her debts, to shoulder perfectly her social and communal duties. Those are the duties she lived up to. She paid the social debts she thought she owed the entire members of the community. The local people and even most of the people from the NGO community were of opinions about her behavior, and decision, opinions that bordered on disapproval and some. They all came in shapes that can rightly be called the venomous blend of cynical and ironic tinges. The following three Amharic sayings kept crossing the lips of some people from the local NGO and from the local community: ከስድብ ከፋ ምንድነው ቢሉት፣ እቅሙን ማየውቅ አለ አሉ (Kesidib kifu mindin new bilut akmun mayawq ale alu). Roughly translated this would mean in Amharic that the worst insult a person may suffer from is not to know one's limit. ትበላው የላት ትከናከበው አማራት ((tibelow yellat tikenanebew amarar). This proverb translates in Amharic into saying that she who can't even walk wants to run. ለቂቱ ጨርቅ የለው ቆንጆ ያባብላል ((Leqit'u cherq yellow qonjo yababla). This one saying reinforces the venomous and disapproval tinted reflections of some of the people who happened to pay that last visit to Woizero Ejjig'ayehu's house. It means, in Amharic, he who doesn't meet his basic needs, hypes up for luxuriant ones.

The biting, cold, cynical, razor sharp, disapproving opinions of some people notwithstanding, Woizero Ejjig'ayehu's decision has nothing to do with a decision to run when she can't even walk, nor was it an ostentatious behavior that is not warranted by the thickness of her wallet, nor was it one of a move that stands in utter contradistinction to her economic station in life. On the contrary her decision was ethical rooted deeply into the rational soils of deontological moral precepts that give no room for whatever might follow as a result of the right action. So the bitter, pinching and disapproving rumors in the wake of her decision to pay her social and communal debts found no rooms to swing in. Hers was an action to embody deontological ethics. Hers was a decision in which she lived deontological ethics.

4 Conclusion

In a world where there are people, groups, and states that are sworn in to serve their respective communities but failed miserably to do so, the deeds of Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen leaves a trail of deontological beacons shining bright for eons to come. It was not the law supported contract she entered into that admonished her to shoulder her duties to the manner borne. There were no such formal contracts that Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen entered into. All that she had to observe strictly was the moral precept she has always had ticking with the beat of her heart, and the vibe with the steps of her life and resonating with the tempo of her being. Those moral precepts, when truly, perfectly and honestly lived, do have the power that outweighs the force any law on earth can muster up. The moral precepts, upon their being meted out without recourse to what is going to follow are the ones Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen only had on her mind. If half, or even a quarter of the global forces that are sworn in to a duty that admonishes them to serve their respective people, our world would have been way too better a place to live in (Mindaralew, 2016). Had the governments the world over done what is their duty simply because it is the right thing to do their duty to which they were sworn in the very day they stepped onto the seat of power, our world would have been at least bereft of the blame games, and the shift blame games and the projection games, what not. Woizero Ejjig'ayehu's behavior has left behind quite a lot to learn from such that all colonial forces would consider the debts they owed the countries they colonized. It is a global debt they owed the global community, In sum, the decisions reached and the moral behavior lived by Woizero Ejjig'ayehu Makonnen shall remain a case in point where living deontological ethics is concerned, where the beauty of living in perfect compliance to one's duty is concerned, where the price we should meet in order to pay the debts we owe someone, everyone, near and afar, in this world of infinilineality, in this world whose diagnostic marks are infinite lines of interconnections.

5 CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

No conflict of interest was reported.

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